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爱尔兰沃特福德理工学院论文代写:合同理论

当一个成员的剩余索取权超过资产总收益的剩余索取权小于资产的生产生活时,出现了地平线的问题。这个问题发展环境投资其中的存在是为了一个成员的阻碍导致机会的增长对(Graham等人2005)。存在一个压力,因此在董事会和更高的管理相对于加速赎回权益的保留盈余费用。它已被建议的一般地平线问题的观点,通过补偿给成员退出从投资合作社将导致改善的激励措施,在合作社内的投资。该观点看似简单,但存在的问题,关于退出支付的决心,这等于为员工的价值为零。这一付款与退出是通过一致的成员支付,所以没有明显的股权赎回的成员退出将导致对投资的激励措施正在改善。
改革通过建立公平的薪酬的安排,通向自由被提供给个人,但这并没有从性能的角度来看任何意义。在不注重绩效的情况下,导致股东的两种成本类型。首先为组织提供他们的高管补充控股或其他产生价值的股东对高管的发明将不再适用股权新鲜补助是很重要的。这些补助的经济条款的补充稀释特定股东通过减少公司的所有制分数。如果管理人员立即解除股票的能力,那么高管的股权的补充成本也将减少。
其次,当管理人员能够立即出售他们的股票后,立即投资,然后它导致的管理人员的重点是获得更多的价格,是短期的。这些都是价格上的高管能够消除他们的股份和摆脱他们的选择(Graham等人2005)。然而,在任何特定的时间,一个大的共享的归属可能已经积累了管理人员与一个希望卸载他们一段时间。

爱尔兰沃特福德理工学院论文代写:合同理论

The problem of horizon happens when the residual claims of a member over the total generated income through an asset is lesser than the asset’s productive life. This problem develops an environment of investment wherein there exists a members disincentive in order to lead towards opportunities of growth (Graham et al 2005). There exists a pressure, consequently over the directors in the board and the higher management with respect to acceleration of redemption of equity at the retained earning expense. It has been suggested by the general horizon problem view that by compensation being given to the members to exit from the investment cooperatives will lead towards improvement of incentives in investment within cooperatives. The view may seem simple but there exist problems with regard to exit payment determination which equals to zero value for the employees. This payment with exit is paid through consistent members and so there is nothing obvious about the equity redemption for members to exit will lead towards incentives of investment being improved.

By reforming the arrangements of pay through build up of equity leads towards freedom being offered to individuals but this does not make any sense from the perspective of performance. Under pay without focusing on performance, leads towards two costs types over shareholders. Firstly it is important for organizations to provide their executives with fresh grants of equity for replenishing the holdings or else the inventive of the executives for generating value to the shareholders will no longer be applicable. These grants of replenishment on economic terms dilute particular shareholders through reduction of ownership fractions for the corporate. If there was ability on the executives for unwinding stocks immediately then the replenishment cost for executive’s positions of equity will also decrease.

Secondly, when executives are able to sell shortly their equity immediately after investment then it leads towards the focus of the executives to be gained more over prices that are short terms. These are the prices on which the executives are able to remove their shares and get rid of their options (Graham et al 2005). However, at any specific time, a large share vested number may have been accumulated by the executives with a wish to unload them some time.