此外，對於那些在籌集新資本方面價值被低估的公司來說，這將帶來更大的問題，成本也非常高昂。Frank et al(1990)指出，合並和退出的接管在制度上為英國的高管解雇創造了更高的記錄水平。
在制度化的市場中，養老金資本顯然在尋求保險的機構中占主導地位，就像其他分散的英國機構一樣(Hribar et al . 2006)。因此，有人聲稱，擁有英國公司股票的機構非常願意在市場內或通過接受接管投標來拋售，以便在短期內迅速獲利。但在研究機構中，企業對企業的忠誠度似乎仍有所下降。還有人認為，總的來說，英國股東傾向於退出，而不是發表意見。然而，Brown等人(1994)最近的一項研究並沒有發現受托人養老基金的短期行為具有壓倒性的證據。盡管他們發現了一些證據，表明受托人也依賴於短期績效的衡量，但他們仍然不認為這是一個大的層面。
很明顯，像養老金基金這樣的金融機構有各種各樣的理由給管理部門施加短期壓力，因為它們在巨大的壓力下運作(Koh等，2005年)。英國投資分析師Arnold等(1984)認為，在對投資的評估中，更重要的是發布股息和收益等財務數據，以表明短期態度。也有人認為，基金經理的目標是短期的，因為他們必須在短期內承受巨大的壓力。這是因為他們的業績組合是基於季度來衡量的。如果他們表現不好，他們可能會失去工作，這從他們經常這樣做的角度就可以證明。Marsh(1990)提出了一種相反的觀點，他特別指出，即使績效測量者在一個季度周期內收集信息，發布的數據比較績效通常是一年或更長時間(Klein et al . 2009)。阿什頓等人(Ashton et al .， 1991)最近對基金經理績效評估的研究經常與這種說法相矛盾。阿什頓等人的研究結果表明，在每種情況下，基金每年至少估值4次，然後對基金經理進行年度評估。阿什頓等人(1991)還觀察到，經理們從工作中獲得的主要獎勵似乎是當他們表現得比季度平均水平更好時的滿足感。Cosh等人(1990)也支持這樣一種觀點，即市場壓力越來越多地指向對短期業績的評估。這裏還可以舉出一個例子，商業銀行以及股票經紀公司對養恤基金下的客戶和其他客戶的結轉投資進行了比以前更為頻繁和專業的評估(Lord 1996)。此外，他們得出的結論是，以機構為基礎的投資者更傾向於短期投資，他們對成功的判斷超過3年，有時甚至更短。人們認為，短期業績指標和客戶波動性導致基金經理在考慮短期業績時面臨壓力。Arnold等人(1984)還發現，所有分析師的時間範圍一般為2年。
Such concern on prices of shares can lead towards espousing management to pressures in the short term through financial institutes that hold major shares in organizations (Groot 1998). Preference given by institutional investors on exiting instead of voicing indicated that the stakeholders are not satisfied with the performance of the companies or their policies and have likeliness for selling their holdings within those organizations.
This, moreover, makes it more problematic and very costly for companies who are undervalues for raising newer capital. According to Frank et al (1990), it was illustrated that take-over of combinations and exits, institutionally have created higher recorded level for UK based executive dismissals.
Within the institutionalized market, pension capital is apparent to pre-dominate the organizations seeking insurance as well as their holdings on share, just as other British organizations which are quite fragmented (Hribar et al 2006). Therefore it is claimed that the institutes owning British companies shares are very much ready for selling out either within market or through acceptation of taking over bid so as to make a fast profit in the short term. But still there appears a less loyalty for companies among institutes. It is also argued that British shareholders, overall, are inclined at exiting instead of voicing. A recent study, however, by Brown et al, (1994), has not found short term behaviour overwhelming evidence through trustee’s pension funds. Even though they found some evidence of suggesting that trustees also depend upon measures for short term performance but still they do not believe as such at a major level.
It is apparent that finance institutes such as funds for pensions have various reasons to put management related short term pressures as they operate under tough pressures (Koh et al 2005). As per Arnold et al, (1984), analysts from UK investment, position more importance on publishing finance data such as dividends and earnings to indicate short term attitude within their appraisals of investment. It is also been argued that objectives of fund managers are short term based as they are made to operate under tough pressure in the short term. This is because of the fact that their performance portfolio is measured based on quarter. If they perform in a bad way, they might result in losing their jobs as is evidenced through the perspective that they do in a frequent manner. Marsh (1990) put a counter-argument forward inter alia illustrating that even though measurers of performance collect information over a quarterly cycle, the figures comparative performance published is generally for one year period or more (Klein et al 2009). Such assertion is often contradicted through a recent research of fund managers performance evaluate as illustrated by Ashton et al (1991), who results indicated that in every case the fund was valued at the least 4 times each year and the managers were evaluated then on a year basis. Ashton et al (1991) moreover observed that the chief reward which managers seem obtaining from work was the satisfaction feeling when performing in a better manner in comparison to their average on quarter basis. Cosh et al(1990) as well supported the view that pressure in the market has been directed increasingly assessment of short term performance. An example can further be quoted here that merchant banks as well as stockbroking, carry over investment for clients under pension fund and other clients privately were assessed in a frequent and professional manner than previously (Lord 1996). They were furthermore of the conclusion that institution based investors have become more oriented to short term and success has been judged by them over 3 years period and sometimes even less. Performance measures in the short term as well as client volatility was felt as such that it led towards putting pressure over fund managers when they look at performance of short term nature. Arnold et al, (1984), moreover were able to find that the time horizon for all analysts is 2 years as a general basis.