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英国切尔西艺术与设计学院论文代写:绩效薪酬

这些上市公司的固定薪酬的首席执行官也增加了一倍,因为以前的5年上升到约1.8美元,这是增加了4倍,比普通工人的工资增长了倍。据澳大利亚超级投资者澳大利亚理事会的调查证实了这一结果。据ACSI,董事会成员大量需要督促安抚不满的雇员,就不能完成的障碍,放下他们的表现路径(Graham等人2005)。这也使得高管们的薪酬始终处于风险之中,因此,股东的关注是短期绩效工资几乎增加了一倍,并要求长期执行的绩效薪酬的障碍要比高层管理人员的薪酬要小得多。绩效工资因此有迷失感和偏好的大多数会计师事务所都无法拒绝他们尊敬的首席执行官,而把员工变成一个更容易的方法。
委托代理的范式位于企业金融产业中心。相对于从属动机的主要问题提供了一个离散的洞察力在围绕债务问题、公平问题,股利的困境,对于高管薪酬甚至监管机构。为了理解什么是风险厌恶的,它变得清楚明白的基本问题,委托代理时发生的最大的努力是选择的代理决策(Graham等人2005)。然而,另一方面,被认为是必要的股东是预期的利润最大化的两个重要的约束,这是激励和约束的参与代理的相容性。
它已被建议的机构的理论,一个组织可以是明显的,作为一个合同持有人之间的关系的资源。代理关系发展个人组,称为委托人与代理人受雇于这些校长称为代理人之间(Graham等人2005)。股东和经理之间的关系,以及与债务持有人和股东。本机构的关系,特别是对自我利益的行为,提出的基本问题。一个公司的经理有个人的目标,需要与股东财富最大化目标竞争。作为股东的权力,在管理者与管理的资产的公司,所以存在一个潜在的利益冲突存在于2个选定的组,特别是股东和管理者之间的。作为管理者的权威是利益相关者提供的,重要的是管理公司的资产,因为有一个存在的利益冲突。

英国切尔西艺术与设计学院论文代写:绩效薪酬

The CEOs fixed pay among these listed companies had also doubled since the previous 5 years rising to approximately 1.8 dollar million which is increase considerably by 4 times more faster than the ordinary workers pay. This was confirmed by the survey reported by the Super investors Australian Council. According to ACSI, board members in large numbers are requiring an urge of placating unhappy employees with respect to not accomplishing the hurdles laid down in their performance paths (Graham et al 2005). This has also made the executives pay to always remain under risk and because of this the concern of the shareholders was performance pay of short term doubled nearly and the barriers for the performance pay of long term being demanding lesser than the distinct executives at the senior level. The performance pay therefore has disorientations and partiality as most of the accounting firms are unable to say no to their respected CEOs whereas turning down the employees becomes an easier approach.
The paradigm of principal and agent is situated at the corporate finance industries center. The main problem with respect to subordinate motivation delivers a discrete insight within the problems that encircle debts, equity issues, dividend dilemmas, pay for executives and even regulators. In order to understand what risk aversion is, it becomes clear to understand the basic problem of principal agent which occurs when maximization of efforts is chosen as a decision by the Agent (Graham et al 2005). However, on the other hand, what is considered essential by the shareholders is the maximization of profits expected subjected towards two important constraints which as the compatibility of incentive and the constraint of participation by the agent.
It has been suggested by the theory of agency that an organization can be evident as a contracts nexus between holders of resources. A relationship of agency develops between individual groups which are termed as principals and the agents hired by these principals are called as agents (Graham et al 2005). The relationship develops between stockholders and managers along with debt holders and stockholders. Fundamental problems are raised by this agency relationship especially with regard to the behavior of self interest. A manager of a corporate has individuals goals that are required to be competed with the shareholder wealth maximization goals. As the authority of the shareholders in on the managers with regard to administering the assets of firms so there exists a potential interest conflict present between 2 selected groups especially the shareholders and the managers. As the authority to the managers is given by stakeholders, it is important for administering the assets of the firm as there is an existence of conflicting interests.